

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

THE UNIVERSITY  
OF MICHIGAN

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COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Friday, 8 March 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. M. TARABANOV

(Bulgaria)

63-08902

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. A. de MELO FRANCO  
Mr. R. L. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO  
Mr. Frank da COSTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TERABINOV  
Mr. G. GUELEV  
Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON  
U. MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS  
Mr. S. F. RAE  
Mr. A. E. GOTLIEB  
Mr. R. M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA  
Mr. V. PECHOTA  
Mr. V. VAJNAR  
Mr. A. MIKULIN

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU  
Ato M. HAMID  
Ato M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A. S. LALL  
Mr. A. S. MEHTA  
Mr. S. B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI  
Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI  
Mr. P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. M. T. MBU

Mr. L. C. N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. W. WIECZOREK

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. N. ECONESCU

Mr. O. NEDA

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL

Baron C. H. von PLATEN

Mr. U. ERICSSON

Mr. E. CORNELL

Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics:

Mr. S. K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. A. A. ROSHCHIN

Mr. I. G. USACHEV

Mr. P. F. SHAKHOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. F. HASSAN

Mr. S. AHMED

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. S. E. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON  
Mr. J.G. TAHOUDIN  
Mr. D.N. BRINSON  
Mr. R.C. BEETHAM

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE  
Mr. D.E. MARK  
Mr. V. BAKER  
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. M.A. VELLODI

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from French): I declare open the one hundred and sixth meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): At last Wednesday's meeting the Committee heard a number of interesting statements, some of which made a positive contribution to our work. I should like to mention specially the statement by the representative of Burma, who very pertinently summarized the present state of our work. I was particularly in agreement with Mr. Barrington when he said that we should not give way to discouragement and should continue our efforts unrelentingly in order to secure an agreement on tests (ENDC/PV.105, p.8). Since the beginning of the present session my delegation has been insisting that negotiations on the prohibition of tests should have priority and should be conducted in a thorough manner, since the importance of what is at stake in these negotiations can escape on one. In this connexion I entirely share Mr. Barrington's opinion, since I too am convinced that if we do not make progress towards the solution of the problem of tests, our efforts to secure general and complete disarmament may prove futile as well.

I also listened attentively to the statements of the representatives of Romania (ibid., pp.11 et seq.) and Poland (ibid., pp.26 et seq.). My impression was that those statements, while polemical, attempted to go to the heart of the problem. Indeed, they put forward certain concrete technical views which, while controversial, seemed to indicate a desire to enter into a thorough discussion. Mr. Tsarapkin's statement (ibid., pp.41 et seq.), which followed those of his Romanian and Polish colleagues, unfortunately convinced me that the Soviet Union was, on the contrary, adhering to its negative position. Mr. Tsarapkin reaffirmed that any discussion of those questions which the Western delegations and the delegations of the non-aligned countries have submitted to the Conference would be useless and merely a waste of time as long as there was no agreement on the number of inspections and automatic stations.

I agree that we must not waste our time. However, at recent meetings certain delegations from the socialist countries have continued to put forward sterile polemical arguments of a political nature which certainly do not help the progress

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of our work. Last Wednesday we heard the Polish representative leave the subject of tests in order once more to make unjustified attacks upon the NATO multilateral force or upon the Federal Republic of Germany (ibid., p.32).

The ideas of the Western Powers on the multilateral force have already been explained. The day before yesterday they were reaffirmed by President Kennedy at a press conference. The object of this force, the creation of which is at present under examination, is quite the opposite of that which the delegations of the socialist countries are trying to attribute to it. One of its purposes is to prevent effectively the spread of nuclear weapons. Moreover, there is nothing secret or mysterious or machiavellian in the creation of this force; everyone can read reports in our newspapers of the conversations which are taking place between the NATO countries.

Concerning the Federal Republic of Germany, I should like once more to remind you that, like Italy and the other Western countries, it is a member of a defensive alliance which has given concrete proofs of its character and of its desire for peace. Moreover, it has given a solemn undertaking to its European allies not to possess or to manufacture atomic weapons. I believe it is the only country in the world to have given such an undertaking. Thus, to multiply attacks on the multilateral force and on the Federal Republic of Germany can only lead to confusion of ideas and distract the Committee's attention from its present task, which is to conclude an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests.

Let us therefore return to this task, so fundamentally important for world peace and for the fate of this Conference. When we of the Western delegations make efforts to speed up the negotiations by suggesting the discussion of serious and important problems, the Soviet delegation accuses us of trying to put the cart before the horse (ENDC/PV.104, p.39). In fact we are asking that both the cart and the horse should be discussed. If we wish to do our job, we cannot dispense with either of them; above all, we do not want to run the risk, when we have agreed on the horse, of finding that we have no cart because there is no agreement on methods of inspection.

To me the Soviet delegation's attitude is inexplicable. It seems no longer to accept systems which we have already adopted without difficulty in our negotiations

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and which are quite normal in any kind of negotiations. Take the method which we have used ourselves in preparing the texts so far drawn up by the Committee on general and complete disarmament. In this process, as in the question of tests, the Committee encountered considerable differences of opinion on certain problems. That did not prevent us, however, from pursuing the examination of other questions and establishing texts by common agreement, while leaving certain sections blank or adopting alternatives. Thus, for example, the differences of opinion concerning the duration of a treaty on general and complete disarmament and the duration of the first stage were considerable, but they did not prevent the continuation and the development of our work. We were thus able to draw up document ENDC/40, where the number of years prescribed for the implementation of the treaty was left blank, and document ENDC/55, where two alternatives were offered for the implementation of the first stage of the treaty -- that is to say, either two or three years.

On 27 February my delegation put forward a list of questions (ENDC/FV.103, pp.6,7) which in my view the Conference could examine immediately. This list has been favourable received by several delegations, whom I should like to thank. Some delegations have also made very interesting remarks concerning certain questions contained in this list, and that should encourage us to begin immediately a concrete and constructive effort in common. Perhaps my list is too long and too detailed, but for the moment it would be sufficient to concentrate our attention upon just a few of the points I have raised, leaving the other points to be examined later. Moreover, as I pointed out at that meeting, my list is only indicative and aims merely at providing a basis for a working plan while taking into account all the proposals which have been submitted by the delegations.

In any case, if, as I hope, the Committee wishes to continue its efforts for the rapid conclusion of a test-ban agreement, a well-ordered and concrete method of work will have to be adopted in the hope that we may be able to begin drafting a few initial agreed texts. Even if these texts contained blanks or alternatives, they would constitute encouraging progress and would facilitate the solution of problems at issue. That is what I wish to say concerning our system of negotiation.

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I should also like to add a few words on the very controversial question of the number of inspections and automatic stations. It seems to me that the acceptance of the principle of inspection by the Soviet delegation -- which the Italian delegation has noted with satisfaction -- indicates that the Soviet Government is now convinced that inspections do not involve a danger of espionage, or at least that it will be possible to find reliable safeguards against that danger. That is also a point on which I should like to express my pleasure, since it indicates that mistrust has diminished. However, if that is so, if it is recognized that inspections are not acts of espionage, why is there such a desperate resistance to acceptance of the number of inspections which is technically necessary? Measures which ensure that an inspection will not present a danger to a country's security can naturally provide the same security for any reasonable number of inspections.

Moreover, we have been told that the Soviet Government set the number at three inspections because it believed that three inspections would be sufficient to secure an agreement and that this was the number asked for by the Western nuclear Powers. Today the Soviet Government knows that it misinterpreted the ideas of the West, or rather did not completely grasp them. Thus the data which determined the Soviet decision have been modified, and if, as I believe, the Soviet Government still sincerely desires the conclusion of an agreement, it should re-examine the situation, taking into account the gestures of goodwill made by the Western nuclear Powers and also the discussions that have taken place here.

After the explanations given by the United Kingdom and the United States representatives, the Soviet delegation cannot fail to understand that the Western delegations are not asking for seven inspections with the object of imposing their own conditions on the other negotiators. That would be inadmissible in any honest negotiations. The figure seven is not a purely fanciful one. It is based on very serious scientific data, which so far have not been countered by any other valid and documented scientific data, and it is justified by these data.



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The remarks made last Wednesday by the Romanian representative (ENDC/PV.105, pp.11 et seq.) in no way invalidate the objectivity and loyalty of the United States position. I think that position is confirmed by those remarks, even if the technical data vary, as is only natural, with the development of science and the increase of knowledge. Moreover, it is difficult to tell whether errors have been made on the Soviet side in the evaluation of technical data on tests; because, in spite of all the appeals we have made here, the Soviet Union has never consented to reveal to us its knowledge in this field, or to inform us of the degree of perfection of its instruments and the scientific observations which its scientists have achieved.

In regard to the automatic stations, I think that the very name "black boxes" which has been given to them justifies a request for clarification. Here, too, both sides should give us a technical definition and provide a few explanations. In any case, the little that we know of the "black boxes" does not appear to justify the Soviet delegation's reluctance to accept a more extensive control by means of these automatic stations. I do not understand how the installation of seven or eight automatic stations could inconvenience the Soviet Union. As we know, these stations are to be unmanned, established on fixed sites, and serviced only by teams which periodically, on agreed dates, would remove the records from the control equipment. All this would be controlled very strictly and, as we know, would be attended by every possible guarantee. If, as I believe, the Soviet Union recognizes that a control team would not engage in acts of espionage, then it can scarcely believe that automatic stations will be used as a means for compromising Soviet security or for discovering secrets which the Soviet Union has a right to preserve. In any case it seems to me that, simply in order to satisfy the security requirements of the Soviet Union and to work out an arrangement which will give it entire satisfaction, it would be useful to study immediately all the provisions that should accompany the creation, installation and utilization of automatic stations.

I have already spoken of parallel negotiations on the number of inspections and of automatic stations and on other more important problems. Several delegations here have used the same term "parallel work", or have put forward a similar notion. That is a logical and rational system. In particular, it is the only system which

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can be employed if we desire, as we do desire, to explore all avenues which could lead to an agreement. It is now for the Soviet delegation to decide whether this concrete and constructive method is to be adopted; and my delegation sincerely hopes that the Soviet delegation will end by accepting it. I do not believe that world opinion, which has focused its attention and its hopes upon this Conference's work, could understand such an opposition of principle or could regard it as justified.

Sir Paul MASON(United Kingdom): I have listened with great interest to what today's first speaker, Mr. Cavalletti, has just said, and I hope in the course of my observations to take up one or two of the points he has made.

I should like to begin my observations by paying tribute, as Mr. Cavalletti did, to the most interesting and statesmanlike speech which was made at our last meeting by the representative of Burma (ENDC/PV.105, p.6). My delegation, and I myself, agreed with almost everything that he said. We agreed with him when he suggested that we should put the work of this Conference, and the stage which we have reached, into the perspective of the past history of our discussions. It is indeed true that we have come a long way since those early days, and not merely a long way in the point of time. We agreed with the suggestion which he made to us that we could still regard our situation in this Conference in a spirit of reasoned optimism. I think that would be a fair rendering of his words. We agreed with him also when he pointed to the sense of urgency with which we have to conduct our discussions. We agreed with what he said about the efforts which both sides -- if I have to call them that -- have made to try to enlarge the area of our common understanding and agreement. Perhaps I may say that I sometimes wish we could hear a little more from our Eastern colleagues in recognition of the efforts -- and they are serious efforts -- which have been made by the Western nuclear Powers to enlarge that area of agreement. We on our part have never failed to make due acknowledgement of the efforts of our Eastern colleagues in that direction.

We agreed in particular with one observation made by Mr. Barrington when he said:

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"... in regard to on-site inspection it would be difficult to come to agreement on numbers without an understanding being reached simultaneously on the fundamentals -- I repeat, on the fundamentals -- of the modalities of inspection;"  
(ENDC/PV.105, pp. 9.10)

That is a point which I also hope to take up later in the course of my observations.

I think there is in fact perhaps only one point on which I am not quite sure that I could entirely agree with what the representative of Burma said. If I understood him rightly, he seemed to imply that if we were to embark on a discussion of general and complete disarmament or of collateral measures at this stage, we should be running away from our responsibilities (ibid., p.10). I think he suggested also that there was little prospect of progress on those subjects. I entirely agree, of course, that our best chance of early success in this Committee lies in the nuclear tests issue. It is quite clear that agreement on a test ban would provide an immense stimulus to our other work, and I most certainly think that we should continue to concentrate on the test-ban question.

But I suggest that we ought not to forget that our main task here is to hammer out an agreement on general and complete disarmament. That, after all, is what the Eighteen Nation Committee was established for. We have a very great deal of work to do before we can even claim to be in sight of agreement. We have an agreed agenda, which we are only about one-third of the way through, and I imagine that we cannot hope for positive results until we have completed that agenda in what might be called a first reading. Therefore, even if our discussion of nuclear tests does not lead to immediate results, I do not think that we ought to lose sight of our ultimate goal.

Then again, quite apart from our major goal of general and complete disarmament, we should perhaps consider that we have an intermediate goal -- I might describe it as a stepping stone towards general and complete disarmament -- and that is the reaching of agreement on collateral measures. I do not claim that the possibilities offered by proposals under that heading are as potentially stimulating as is the possibility of a nuclear test ban. They are not. But the goal seems to me to be well worth pursuing, because anything which leads to the elimination of suspicion and the creation of confidence between us must help us towards our final goal.

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The United Kingdom delegation therefore remains more than ready to discuss any collateral measures which the co-Chairmen may agree to recommend to us; and if at any time we find ourselves irrevocably deadlocked over the test-ban issue, I myself think that we should seriously consider turning to them.

That being said, it is of course a fact that the test ban remains our immediate concern: and on this I should like first to take up some points which were made in the discussion at our last meeting, on 6 March (ENDC/PV.105). We were then presented by several of our East European colleagues with the argument that the claim of the Western nuclear Powers to found their proposal for on-site inspections on scientific and technical considerations was ill-conceived and unjustifiable. That argument was, I thought, admirably answered by our United States colleague, Mr. Stelle (ibid.); but I should like to make a few general comments.

In 1958 the experts based their report (EKP/NUC/23) on the possibility of inspecting every unidentified event -- I emphasize the word "every" -- which could be suspected of being a nuclear weapon explosion. They suggested criteria for determining those events. As we all know, the Soviet Union was represented on the Committee of Experts and endorsed the experts' report. They were working on the basis of the information then available. Since then new information has been acquired, and governments have been able to adjust their conclusions accordingly. I have no doubt myself that if a new committee of experts were to be established today it would arrive at different conclusions from those reached by the 1958 committee. It would do so because of the new information available; but the new information is available and is made public solely because the West has carried out research.

We on the Western side have frequently offered to collaborate with the Soviet Union in that research. That offer remains open, but the Soviet Union has consistently ignored it or refused it. It will not take part in a joint effort with us to reach agreed conclusions on the effectiveness of existing detection methods, nor will it make available to us the information which it claims to have and on which it claims to base its present attitude in negotiations for a nuclear weapon test ban.

I should have left the matter at that point had it not been for some observations which were made at our last meeting by our colleague from Poland. As I understood him, Mr. Blusztajn implied (ENDC/PV.105, p.30) that the position of the Western Powers -- when they claim to base themselves on a scientific assessment in their estimation of the number of inspections which

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should take place -- had now either disappeared or very largely changed; I think he implied that that was so because the scientific evidence itself had left them, so to speak, stranded. I think he implied also that the Western Powers now based themselves in that matter primarily upon what he called political and technical criteria. In my opinion that is a completely inaccurate estimate of the position of the Western nuclear Powers, and therefore I feel I should take a minute or two to try to set the record straight.

Wherever the position of the Western Powers has been modified, it has been modified against the background of our scientific assessment of the events that will remain unidentified in any one year in the Soviet Union. I hope there will be no mistake about that point; the Western nuclear Powers have not ceased to base the size of the quota which they seek on a fundamental scientific assessment. Our position is based on the best scientific evidence we can obtain of the number of seismic events of a significant size which would be likely to occur in the Soviet Union every year, and which without on-site inspection it would not be possible to identify as being due to natural causes. The number may obviously vary a little from year to year, but it is possible on the basis of our scientific advice to get a fair approximation of it.

If our assessment is disputed -- that is to say, if the Soviet Union has evidence to offer to show that we are wrong -- then, as has been said many times, the Western nuclear Powers are more than ready to discuss the matter and, if they are convinced, to review their position. But if no contrary evidence is produced, we must continue to base ourselves on the evidence that is available to us. Thereafter, of course, we must make a judgement about how many of those unidentified events we consider it necessary to inspect in order to provide a deterrent to any country which may consider violating a test ban and carrying out one or more underground nuclear weapon tests a year. That is the idea of the quota.

The decision on the size of the quota, that is to say on the number of unidentified events a year which we wish to inspect in order to provide a deterrent, is of course a political one. The conception of a deterrent is, we admit, political. Furthermore, our decision on the size of the quota must be affected also by our understanding of the manner in which inspections will be carried out. To be effective inspections must be quick, impartial, and unimpeded. Our United States colleague dealt with that point at our last meeting at some length, and I do not think that I need to go into it any further at present.

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Thus the fact remains that we continue to base ourselves in essence on the best scientific evidence available to us of the number of unidentified events we may expect in any year in the Soviet Union. We do not think that it is reasonable to attempt to arrive at a figure for the quota on any other basis. I hope that that explanation will now serve to set the record straight and that our attitude will not be open further to misconception.

In the light of what I have been saying, I am bound to confess that I find criticism of the attitude of the Western nuclear Powers singularly misplaced, and in using those words I am making a good English understatement. But I shall be a little more frank when I say that it is very hard to bear when I hear -- as I was compelled to hear last Wednesday -- allegations made by our colleagues from Bulgaria and from the Soviet Union that Western scientists have shown themselves tendentious and devoid of objectivity (ENDC/PV.105, p.42). I must say respectfully but very firmly that I think allegations of that kind are totally improper. I am quite convinced that they carry no weight whatever either in this Conference or in the minds of public opinion at large. It is very regrettable that they are made, because they can only serve to make the feelings of those who are trying to reach an agreement more tense. I am bound to say that we in the West would never think of making such charges against Soviet scientists. Indeed, our only complaint is that we are too seldom allowed to hear and to know about their work.

We in the West have certainly modified our position considerably. We have done so in the interests of achieving a nuclear weapon test ban; but we have done so also on what we believe to be sound technical grounds which we are prepared at any time to discuss with the Soviet Union. Moreover, we have not modified our position on numbers only; we have modified it on the whole conception of international control and verification; and, as I have said, we have done so on grounds which we are more than ready to explain and to discuss. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, offers us a position which it refuses to explain until we have accepted it. We are told nothing except that it is a political position. It is not explained to us -- not at all -- what it would mean in practice; we are simply asked to accept it if we want agreement.

May I therefore summarize the position of this matter as I see it at the moment? The Western nuclear Powers offer a number both of on-site inspections and of automatic stations, and they offer to justify those numbers with detailed facts and

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arguments. The Soviet Union says that it will not listen to our facts or our arguments, and suggests that our number is larger than its own because we wish to use the extra number of inspections and the extra number of automatic detection stations for espionage. We say that we are prepared to discuss any measures which the Soviet Union likes to ensure that no inspection and no detection post is used for espionage. That was a point to which our Italian colleague referred earlier this morning. The Soviet Union refuses; it continues to say that we must first accept its numbers; unless that is done, nothing else can be discussed even in broad outline -- nothing at all.

Are we to be totally discouraged by that position? I noticed that our Italian colleague mentioned (Supra, p.6) that at the meeting on 1 March our Soviet colleague had suggested that we in the West, by proposing that we might have discussions on all matters of importance relating to the conclusion of a nuclear test ban treaty, were attempting to put the cart before the horse (ENDC/PV.104, p.39) -- the horse, as I understood it, being the necessity to reach agreement on the question of numbers, the cart being the question of discussing the numerous problems of the greatest importance which have to be decided outside that particular issue. Sometimes, in my more pessimistic moments, I feel that the picture which comes to one's mind is that of the horse being allowed to gallop rather wildly ahead with Mr. Tsarapkin and his Eastern European colleagues perched, perhaps a little precariously, astride it, while the rest of us are left, somewhat disconsolately, to push the cart on its way as best we can.

I said that that is a picture which comes to me in my more pessimistic moments. In fact, however, I do not think that it is the real picture; and if I may take the time of the Conference for a few minutes more I will explain why. It involves going back to the very early days of the Conference and to an experience which in fact does not properly concern the Conference at all but concerned the original three-Power Conference to discuss cessation of nuclear weapon tests, of which at least three people here, Mr. Stelle, Mr. Tsarapkin, and I myself, have a certain amount of direct knowledge.

At the second meeting of that Conference, on 3 November 1958, Mr. Tsarapkin submitted an agenda (GEN/DNT/2) for the Conference. According to that agenda the Conference would have been obliged first to conclude an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests and then -- but only then -- to discuss provisions concerning

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the control over the observance of the agreement. The Western representatives argued that that proposal was hardly logical. We said that it amounted to asking the parties to an agreement to sign it without knowing what they were undertaking or what guarantees they would have that other parties would observe that agreement. As I recall, we continued to argue that point for several weeks -- for at least as long, at any rate, as we have been sitting here since we re-convened in February. Mr. Tsarapkin said at that time, as he is saying now, that the West was putting the cart before the horse; and Mr. Ormsby-Gore, as he then was, countered, I recall, by saying that the West was being asked to buy "a pig in a poke" -- a phrase which, as I remember, caused a little difficulty both to Mr. Tsarapkin and to the interpreters; but if there is still any misunderstanding on that point I think it will be quite easy to correct it by looking up the records of the time. However, what I wish to say is that eventually the three parties found it possible so to arrange their discussions in the general interests of making progress that there ensued a period of fruitful negotiation which lasted, with its ups and downs for more than two years and which did succeed in producing the greater part of an agreed draft treaty.

I wonder whether the position in which we find ourselves today has not some points of resemblance with that position. When I think of that, I feel hopeful that with patience and perseverance history may repeat itself. This is where I pick up again the quotation which I used at the beginning of my speech from the remarks of our colleague from Burma. I do not want to think in terms of one side making concessions to the other. I think that the phrase "making concessions" is a hateful term, and I use the strong word deliberately when I think of it in terms of this Conference. We around this table are not here trying to make debating points at each other's expense, and we are not here, I hope, simply to think of ourselves as two sides almost inevitably and inextricably opposed. Surely we are here, all of us, to try to reach agreement, to try to extend the area of agreement as widely as possible; and that we can do only if we have the greatest amount of knowledge and the greatest degree of freedom to discuss all matters of importance. When I say "of importance" I am not talking about detail, I am talking about matters which are of fundamental importance to the conclusion of a treaty.

I am not trying to advocate any single form of procedure in order to bring about the kind of result I have in mind. Many suggestions have been made. Our Italian colleague reminded us again this morning of some of the points which he has made in the past, and he made some suggestions about simplifying or streamlining his proposals.



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Other colleagues all round the table have also made proposals, and, as the United Kingdom delegation has said in the past and will say again, we remain prepared to accept any one of those proposals which may prove to unlock the door of progress; but we are not wedded to formal decisions, we are not wedded to formal methods of procedure.

I sometimes envisage something happening -- as indeed happened in 1958 -- which would result in our slipping into a discussion, if I may use the phrase, of matters which we all think important, and in our being able to question each other and to answer each other in greater freedom than happens at present. I do not feel at all convinced that the exchanging of set speeches -- to which, of course, I have to plead guilty myself this morning -- is the right way of proceeding.

We in the United Kingdom delegation feel that the informal meeting that we had a few days ago was of real value. We feel, as my delegation has said many times, that the reconstitution of the test ban Sub-Committee would provide a much better forum. There are many other and less formal ways of working than what we are doing at present, which I think could help us to set in motion the right kind of exchange of views -- the exchange of views without which we shall not succeed in achieving our goal.

I am somewhat encouraged to believe that we might succeed in reaching a working method of that kind by what I think I have gathered from our Soviet colleague himself in some of his recent statements. I hope I am not misquoting or misinterpreting him, but I have the impression, for example, that he had indicated that, if we could accept the Soviet proposal on the number of inspections and the number of automatic stations today, we could embark at once on discussion of the modalities of inspection and detection (ENDC/PV.105,p.41). As our United States colleague has pointed out (ibid., p.21), that surely must imply that the Soviet Union has fully thought through its ideas about the way in which the inspection and detection system would work; and, if that is so, it must surely not be too difficult for the Soviet Union to decide at least to let us know what those thoughts are.

Similarly, I think -- and again I hope I am correct -- that Mr. Tsarapkin has given us to understand that he believes that, if we were to accept the Soviet proposal on numbers, everything else could be settled quickly. That must surely mean -- at least I hope it does mean -- that Soviet thinking on the other problems is fairly close to our own, and our own thinking has been made abundantly clear on many occasions over the past months.

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In conclusion I would say that, despite some sense of discouragement as a result of our recent meetings, I, like our colleague from Burma, am not despondent. We in the United Kingdom delegation shall continue to do everything in our power to promote real negotiations and to reach agreement. We shall be patient; we shall be hopeful; and we shall not stop trying.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): It seems to us that the time has come to analyse the results of almost a month's discussion in the Eighteen Nation Committee and to assess the present situation. During that time the attention of the members of the Committee has been mainly concentrated on the question of the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. That, of course, does not mean that the other questions before the Committee have lost their importance. On the contrary, the dangerous development of international affairs demands more than ever before that the efforts of the Committee should be directed with renewed vigour and energy towards solving the cardinal problem of our time, namely, the problem of general and complete disarmament, and towards agreeing on measures aimed at consolidating peace.

Among those measures are the proposals contained in the Soviet Union's declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75), and the draft non-aggression pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty (ENDC/77). These proposals, of course, must be considered by the Committee and positive decisions on them must be taken, if we really desire to decrease international tension and to remove the danger of war. It is worth recalling that resolution 1767 (XVII) of the General Assembly of 21 November 1962 directly recommends the Eighteen Nation Committee to give special attention to measures of that nature.

However, we shall return to this question later. Today we intend to set forth certain conclusions which, in our view, follow from the discussions that have taken place on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

At recent meetings we have heard various assessments of the situation which has come about in our negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear tests. We have heard such assessments as "constructive scepticism", or "cautious optimism". There are certain grounds for these far from encouraging, contradictory assessments:

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they reflect the contradictoriness of the situation which has come about in our negotiations. On the one hand, as a result of the important concessions made by the Soviet Union, there emerged a possibility of reaching agreement on a compromise, mutually-acceptable basis. On the main issues -- the inspection quota, on which the Soviet Union has in fact gone all the way to meet the wishes of the United States side as expressed during informal conversations and the question of automatic seismic stations and their location -- there are no real differences, but there are differences not deriving from the substance of the matter which have been artificially created by the Western Powers. On the other hand, the possibilities of an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests are becoming more slender; new obstacles are being placed in the way of agreement and the negotiations are again at a deadlock. For our part, we must say quite frankly that the present situation is causing us definite concern for the fate of our negotiations.

The Soviet Government has done everything possible to create the most favourable conditions for a speedy solution of the problem of the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. We have made a decisive concession on inspection. The representative of Burma, Mr. Barrington, in comparing the situation which existed in regard to the prohibition of nuclear tests at the very beginning of the work of this Committee with the present situation, spoke about a "revolution" (ENDC/PV.105,p.7). That evaluation is indeed fully applicable to the changes of position adopted by our Government for the sake of achieving an agreement. They were fundamental and really revolutionary changes in our position.

If our Western colleagues, and particularly the United States, had remained true to their word and had not retreated from their own proposals, we should not now be speaking of a deadlock which threatens our negotiations, but we might already be putting the final touches to the details of an agreement, or even have already signed it. However, we are now faced with the fact that the Western nuclear Powers refuse to accept the mutually-acceptable compromise proposals of the Soviet Union which, in regard to inspection, as I have already emphasized on several occasions, fully meet the wishes which they expressed to us only a few months ago. After obtaining these important concessions from the Soviet Union, the Western Powers wrongly evaluated this manifestation of goodwill on our part and yielded to the temptation to set about getting further concessions from the

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Soviet Union by bargaining. The United States put forward new demands for an increased quota of inspections and an increased number of automatic seismic stations.

How do the United States and the United Kingdom justify their rejection of the Soviet Union's proposal for a quota of two to three annual inspections and the installation of three automatic seismic stations on the territory of each of the nuclear Powers? Although this question has already been touched on here, it needs to be taken up once again, because this is precisely where lies the reason for the lack of success of the new attempts of the Committee to solve the problem of the prohibition of nuclear tests.

The United States and the United Kingdom representatives try to cover up their negative position by references to science. Let us analyse to what extent these references to science are well founded. In this regard our task has been considerably simplified as a result of the statement made by the representative of Romania, Mr. Macovescu, who adduced (ENDC/PV.105, pp.11 et seq) some extremely interesting and eloquent facts showing how "solid" the scientific basis of the United States' position is. I am referring to the discussion between Senator Humphrey and Mr. Foster, which shows quite clearly how arbitrary and precarious was the basis, how unreliable or utterly erroneous were the data and conclusions, underlying the demand of the United States for a greater number of inspections in the Soviet Union. To put it mildly, they were based on a gross error, or perhaps even on something worse. In the passage quoted, Mr. Foster said:

"... I am not sure it was arithmetical, but this was the effect of it."

(ENDC/PV.105, p.13)

We can say quite definitely that this was not a mistake but a deliberate move, and we shall prove this.

Mr. Stelle, in replying to the representative of Romania, on the one hand admitted the authenticity of the facts cited by Mr. Macovescu, and we draw the attention of the members of the Committee to this (ibid., p.18). On the other hand, Mr. Stelle tried to justify the United States. However, the methods he used in doing so are of no avail to him in this task. Mr. Stelle omitted to mention several points which put the actions of the United States in their right perspective. We will fill in the gaps left by Mr. Stelle.

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The United States representative explained that the Government of the United States, in putting forward its demands in regard to the number of inspections on the territory of the Soviet Union, fell victim to its own faulty data derived from the nuclear tests in the autumn of 1958. Mr. Stelle said:

"Those data, on analysis, moved things in what might be said to be the wrong direction." (ibid. p. 19)

In his own words, the results of the underground tests in the autumn of 1961, the conclusions from which, incidentally, were drawn by the United States at the end of the summer of 1962, "moved the problem in the right direction..." (ibid.)

What is the conclusion to be drawn? The conclusion is that for four years -- we draw your attention to this period -- for four years the United States built its position and based its demands on erroneous data. Was this an accidental mistake of which the United States Government was unaware? It was not. And here are the facts to substantiate this.

At the Geneva meeting of scientists of the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom in November and December 1959, the Soviet scientists drew the attention of their United States colleagues to the lack of scientific foundation of the conclusions by means of which the United States tried to justify its demand for a higher number of inspections. I will quote from the statement made by the Soviet scientists on 18 December 1959:

"Having uncovered many errors as mentioned above, and even some misrepresentation, in United States statements and documents, the Soviet experts note that they all tend in a single direction -- towards reducing the estimates of the control system's effectiveness. The Soviet experts therefore cannot regard these shortcomings as resulting from carelessness or coincidence and have come to the conclusion that there has been tendentious use of one-sidedly developed material for the purpose of undermining confidence in the control system."

(GEN/DNT/TWG 2/9, Annex 2, p. 8)

It will be of interest to the members of the Committee to compare two more facts. At the aforementioned meeting of experts, that is in late 1959, the Soviet scientists pointed out that the number of earthquakes would be two to three times less than was asserted by the United States experts. At that time the United States experts categorically disputed this contention of the Soviet scientists. And here is what

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was said literally a few days ago by Mr. Adrian Fisher, Assistant Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in a letter he wrote to The Washington Post and which appeared in that newspaper on 4 March 1963. I will quote these words of Mr. Fisher:

"We now know also that the number of earthquakes in the USSR is less by a factor of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  than we previously believed."

You see what is happening. A responsible United States spokesman has finally admitted the accuracy of the conclusions arrived at by Soviet scientists as far back as 1959, although Mr. Fisher is doing this four years later. Why do I put forward these facts? Merely to show that the United States Government was not unaware that the data on which it based its demands were incorrect.

What has the United States Government done? Has it admitted the error that was made? Not at all. In reply to the conclusions of the Soviet scientists the President of the United States made a statement on 29 December 1959 to the effect that the Government of the United States was ending the moratorium on nuclear tests and was freeing itself from its commitment to refrain from conducting such tests. As is well known, already at that time active preparations for new nuclear weapon tests were being carried on in the United States.

In the light of these facts, Mr. Stelle's endeavours to make out that the Government of the United States was the victim of a mistake are quite unconvincing. No, there was no mistake; there was a definite political line, an unwillingness to come to an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, and all the controversies and references to science and techniques served merely as a plausible pretext for blocking an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

We can also point out another fact. The Soviet delegation has drawn the Committee's attention to the very peculiar approach of the United States Government to the question of an inspection quota. The territory of the United States is considerably more seismic than the territory of the Soviet Union. This has been mentioned by such a world authority in the field of seismology as Dr. Richter. Nevertheless, knowing the mistrust which the United States shows towards scientists who do not toe the official line of the United States Government, which is determined

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in this matter by the Pentagon and the United States Atomic Energy Commission, we have referred to the statements of another United States scientist, Dr. Latter, who is in the employ of the Atomic Commission, so that it is to be assumed that his statements are convincing evidence with which the United States Government also can agree. According to the data of Dr. Latter, at least three times as many seismic events occur each year in the territory of the United States as in the territory of the Soviet Union. If a scientific approach were adopted in determining one's position — as the United States delegation claims to have done —, then the United States should propose for its territory an inspection quota at least three times as great. However, the United States has not done so. In this case also it completely ignores science.

Mr. Stelle tried to justify this deliberately one-sided United States approach with arguments about the size of the territory of the Soviet Union. But what has the size of a territory to do with the matter? After all, you link the inspection quota to the number of seismic events. And are there not three times as many seismic events in the territory of the United States as in the territory of the Soviet Union? Then why inspect a territory if it is quiet, and no earth tremors or seismic events occur there which could be confused with underground nuclear explosions?

There can only be one reply: the only purpose is to rummage in that territory and try to find out something that might be of interest to the United States Intelligence Service and the United States chiefs of staff. The longer our discussion goes on, the clearer it becomes that the crux of the matter lies not in any scientific questions but in political questions. There are virtually no technical or scientific problems that would hinder an agreement on the prohibition of tests. And, of course, it is no mere chance that at recent meetings the Western delegations have changed front and have been trying to deflect the discussion from the inspection quota to other issues. If we stand on the ground of genuine science and take the real facts into account, we can say with confidence that the use of the existing means of detection would guarantee such control as would preclude violation of the agreement. Even if a State were to venture to carry out clandestine explosions — which we do not believe to be likely — it would immediately be unmasked and would stand before the tribunal of the nations as a violator of the agreement.

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It is enough to picture to oneself the system of control which is already within the bounds of the achievable to realize what powerful means it would have at its disposal. This has already been mentioned here on several occasions, but I should like to make it clear once again.

First, the control system would have at its disposal the data received from the national means of detection which many States now possess.

Secondly, there would be the data received from automatic seismic stations on the territories of the nuclear Powers, and the data received from automatic seismic stations on the territories of neighbouring States -- of course with the agreement of the governments concerned.

Further, on-site inspection.

Many of those who have spoken in the Committee have drawn attention to the extensive systems for observing seismic events and experimental nuclear explosions which are already at the disposal of States. It was pointed out here in particular that, at the conversations which took place in New York and Washington in January and February 1963, the United States submitted a list of 76 observation stations in the territory of the United States. The Soviet Union submitted, for its part, a list of 73 stations operating in the Soviet Union. We may also recall the statement made on 1 August by the Swedish representative, Mrs. Myrdal, who pointed out that 800 seismic stations are at present working throughout the world (ENDC/PV.64, p.11). To this it is necessary to add that the technical equipment of these stations is being improved from year to year and that they are being constantly provided with new and better instruments.

At one of our meetings the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, remarked that, even after the conclusion of a nuclear test ban agreement, the United States intended to rely in regard to control first and foremost on the national stations of the United States. What does that mean? It means that by means of its own national observation stations alone the United States is in a position to ensure its control over other States in regard to underground nuclear explosions. Consequently the United States is already in a position to verify whether the Soviet Union is carrying out its obligations, and it can do so even without availing itself of the data from Soviet Seismic stations. In fact, that is what the United States is already doing at present.



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In this connexion I shall take the liberty of quoting an extract from a letter written by the Deputy Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. Fisher, and published in The Washington Post on 4 March. Mr. Fisher emphasized:

"Thanks to recent knowledge and to the experience gained in our study of seismic events in the Soviet Union, we know today that the areas of interest can be controlled with the help of a less extended system, in which the main method for the detection of events in the Soviet Union would be represented by United States national posts staffed with United States personnel and located outside the boundaries of the USSR".

However, if we wish to evaluate correctly the possibilities of control, we must also take into account the following circumstance. After the conclusion of an agreement, we shall not be dealing merely with a collection of national observation systems functioning in isolation. After all, we envisage establishing an international centre which will receive data from practically all the countries in the world. In that case the United States, in addition to the information received from its own national means, will have at its disposal data from many other States, including data from Soviet seismic stations. All that taken together will enable the United States to have a clear picture of all seismic events in the Soviet Union.

Until quite recently the Western Powers kept repeating that they could not trust the national stations of the opposite side. We know that this mistrust is completely groundless and rather artificial. Nevertheless, in view of such statements on the part of the Western Powers and in order to facilitate agreement, the Soviet Government put forward a proposal which makes it possible to eliminate any elements of mistrust of national means of verifying the fulfilment of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

Such means are automatic seismic stations.

In order to ensure control over the proper functioning of national observation systems, a large number of automatic seismic stations is not at all necessary. After consulting our scientists, the Soviet Government put forward a proposal for the installation of three automatic seismic stations on the territory of each of the nuclear Powers. That proposal of ours is based on the obvious fact that national seismic stations are interconnected. All of them record on their instruments the

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same seismic events. This recording is effected in strict sequence of time determined by the speed with which the seismic waves of various kinds traverse the earth's crust in various environments and at different depths. Consequently every seismic event is recorded at a number of stations. Therefore it is sufficient to be assured of one reading, say, at one automatic station, to obtain assurance of the correctness of the work of the whole network of stations.

The foregoing review of the possibilities guaranteed by national means of observation shows that, in order to ensure the fulfilment of a treaty prohibiting nuclear tests, there is no real need for on-site inspection. That is the situation at present. And if we look at the immediate prospects, in this regard too there are interesting data which show quite definitely that still more effective new methods of detecting and identifying underground nuclear explosions, still more efficient recording instruments, will be perfected in the near future. New, complex, highly-sensitive and highly-selective seismic stations will be created. I should like to refer to the following facts.

1. At the beginning of January 1962 -- that is, more than a year ago -- information on tests carried out by the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority with the use of recording instruments was published in the United Kingdom. These tests made it possible to work out a method of detecting underground nuclear explosions by measuring their effect on the earth's magnetic field. It was pointed out in this report that, in the opinion of the United Kingdom scientists, the practical use of this method would make it impossible for any country to carry out clandestine nuclear tests.

2. In March 1962, exactly a year ago, reports were published in the United Kingdom Press on another new method of detecting nuclear explosions worked out by United Kingdom specialists. It was noted in the reports that even the United Kingdom Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, had spoken about this new method of detecting underground nuclear explosions. The station concerned which detects nuclear explosions is situated at Eskdalemuir in the Lake District. It was pointed out that this station would be able to distinguish between underground nuclear explosions and small earthquakes with greater accuracy than had previously been thought possible.

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It was also pointed out that a new method of calculation had been evolved in the United Kingdom which makes it possible to use simultaneously a combination of seismographs and thus to obtain more detailed information about the scale, type, direction and force of an explosion. This new method of evaluating explosions makes it possible to distinguish clearly between a nuclear explosion and an ordinary earthquake.

3. In October 1962, approximately four months ago, the Technological Institute of California announced that a device had been invented in the United States which automatically distinguished tremors of the earth's crust caused by earthquakes from tremors caused by nuclear explosions. This device is a combination of seismographs and an electronic computer. It was constructed at the request of the United States Air Force, certainly not for the purposes of control over an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, but for the very opposite -- for certain control and measuring operations in connexion with nuclear weapon tests. The scientists consider that the automatic analysis of seismic events carried out by this device speeds up the detection of nuclear explosions at great distances. The well-known American seismologist who invented this machine, Dr. Frank Press, said in October 1962, according to the Associated Press Agency:

"The apparatus permits the fixing of the movement of the earth's crust in the whole seismic spectrum and guarantees great precision and breadth in its use. The scope of the apparatus is limited only by the imagination of the scientists."

That is what Dr. Frank Press said of the capability of this apparatus.

The three facts which I have cited are interesting because they indicate even more clearly the baselessness of the position of the United States on the prohibition of underground nuclear tests, and the baselessness of its claims in regard to inspection. Nevertheless, for the sake of achieving an agreement the Soviet Government agreed to two to three inspections a year on Soviet territory. As we have emphasized repeatedly, this was a political decision prompted by good will. It was a great political concession for the sake of achieving an agreement.

By agreeing to an inspection quota, we went beyond what was suggested by the non-aligned States in their joint memorandum a year ago (ENDC/28). At that time they

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suggested that agreement be reached on inspection by invitation. Now we have in fact accepted the inspection quota named by the representatives of the Western Powers.

Thus the Soviet Union, as the head of the Soviet Government, Mr. Khrushchev, recently emphasized in his statement, has done everything possible to clear the ground for the speedy achievement of an agreement.

An absurd and intolerable situation is created by a position based on incorrect assumptions not corresponding to reality. For four years the achievement of an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests was prevented by the position of the United States, a position which, as the United States side has now admitted after a delay of four years, was based on errors, or -- it would be more accurate to say -- on a deliberate distortion of facts. This has already been indicated with sufficient clarity. Now we are again wasting time and missing the opportunity for agreement owing to the same basically fallacious position of the United States.

We consider it our duty to warn the members of the Committee against attempts to deflect it from solving the basic questions and to push the negotiations into the path of technical discussions. Today the representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti, again raised this question (supra, p.7 ), reminding us of the list of technical questions which he had submitted and which he would like to discuss without agreement on the number of inspections and the number of automatic seismic stations. It would not be enough to say that this would be a useless course; it must be said that this would be a harmful course. At present the situation is quite clear. In order to make progress we must reach agreement on the inspection quota and on the number of automatic seismic stations. Discussion of other technical and administrative questions would not help us, but would only divert attention from the main issues awaiting solution.

At the meeting of 6 March Mr. Stelle again stated that the Soviet proposal of a quota of two to three inspections a year was "unacceptable to the United States" (ENDC/PV.105, p.21). And he has been repeating this statement at every meeting, although the Soviet Union has accepted the United States own proposal on the number of inspections, which was transmitted to us by the United States unofficially. There is no justification for the unwillingness of the United States to come to an agreement on that fundamental question.

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In the circumstances, what sense is there in dealing with secondary technical matters if there is no agreement on the main question of an inspection quota? It is clear that there is no real sense in doing so. Whatever may be done on the remaining issues, there can be no agreement without solving the problem of the inspection quota. The only result of such work would be, at best, an empty discussion divorced from reality, a befogging of people's minds with a semblance of negotiations, or, at worst, new differences and the creation of more obstacles in the way of agreement. We came here to try to find a solution to the nuclear test ban problem, not to participate in attempts to cover up virtual inactivity or even sabotage.

On the other hand, if agreement is reached on the inspection quota and the number of automatic seismic stations, then all the other questions will fall into place and wide possibilities will be opened up for their successful and rapid solution.

As we have emphasized on several occasions, the Soviet delegation is ready to begin tomorrow the discussion of all other technical, organizational, financial and administrative issues, if we reach agreement today on the inspection quota and on the number of automatic seismic stations. We do not want merely to talk and dispute; we want a businesslike discussion for the purpose of achieving agreement. We point out once again that the possibilities for such a businesslike discussion and agreement will open up when we have a single basis: agreement on the inspection quota and on the number of automatic seismic stations.

If the United States delegation is really interested in a "rational" way of conducting negotiations, as Mr. Stelle has stated, the path to this is wide open. The United States delegation has only to do one thing -- accept its own figure for the inspection quota which a short time ago the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom considered sufficient for achieving agreement. From all that has been said it is clear that the Western Powers are blocking the way to an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests.

The Soviet delegation understands the motives by which the representatives of the non-aligned countries are guided in expressing their views on the possibility of a so-called parallel discussion of questions. We believe they want somehow to help us to move forward. Unfortunately these views are of little help. Quite

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frankly, such a procedure in our negotiations would play into the hands of those who are trying to complicate them and lead them again into an impasse. Parallel consideration of the inspection quota and other technical and organizational questions would afford wide opportunities for fighting against an agreement to all those who do not want one and intend to submerge the solution of the problem of the inspection quota in a bog of unending, fruitless technical controversies.

The danger of this turn of affairs appears fairly clearly in the statement of the United States representative. Mr. Stelle said quite definitely that the United States makes the question of the inspection quota depend upon various factors, such as the numerical size of inspection teams, their composition according to nationality, the area for inspection and so on (ENDC/PV.105, pp.21 et seq.). Whereas hitherto the United States delegation has based itself mainly on the relationship between the number of seismic events and the inspection quota, which prevented and is still preventing the achievement of agreement and which was and is in essence a pseudoscientific pretext for demanding a larger quota of inspections, now the United States and its Western partners are trying to find further relationships which, as has been pointed out by a number of delegations, have no bearing whatsoever on the question of an inspection quota. The representative of the United States could find no convincing arguments to answer the question put by the representative of Czechoslovakia concerning what relationship there could be between the nationality of the members of inspection teams and the number of inspections. But the Western Powers continue to insist on switching the work of the Committee to secondary technical and other questions.

All this is being done, I stress once again, to complicate the situation, in order to divert the attention of the Committee from the solution of the basic questions and at the same time, of course, to conceal the fact that the Western countries are moving backwards. Thus, from whatever angle we view the position of the Western Powers, we cannot fail to come to the conclusion that in their policy the upper hand is taken by the forces which are opposing the cessation of nuclear tests. It is precisely for this reason that, despite all the efforts of both the Soviet Union and other members of the Committee who are anxious to achieve an agreement, new difficulties and obstacles are constantly cropping up on the path of the negotiations. We cannot disregard the statement made by Mr. Stelle at one of our recent meetings to the effect that the United States sees no need to set

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any time limit for the conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. In effect he expressed himself in favour of an unending and fruitless discussion in the Committee. This remark of the United States representative reflects a definite line of the United States aimed at prolonging the negotiations.

The question of prohibiting nuclear weapon tests cannot be considered in isolation from the events taking place in the world. We are bound to consider the positions of the participants in this Conference in the light of the policy they carry out and in the context of their actions in practice. Therefore, in evaluating the position of the Western Powers, we cannot disregard what is now happening in the United States, where a vast campaign is being carried on against the conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. This campaign includes a growing number of highly-placed individuals to whom the press of the United States very willingly opens its pages.

The situation created in regard to the cessation of nuclear weapon tests is beginning to perturb the world with ever increasing intensity. A bitter struggle is developing over this question. The reactionary and militaristic forces which oppose an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests cannot reconcile themselves to such an agreement, and are mobilizing all their forces and all the means at their disposal to prevent our negotiations from being successful. This is the main reason for the gloomy fact that the agreement for which negotiations have been going on in Geneva for almost five years has not yet been achieved.

We must consider the position of the Western Powers in these negotiations also in connexion with the violent activity for the implementation of various plans designed to intensify the nuclear armaments race and bring more States into it. While the United States delegation is sitting here together with us, emissaries of the United States Government are touring European capitals in an attempt to implement a plan for the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force. The question inevitably arises: to which negotiations does the United States attach importance? To which does it give its preference? After all, they are mutually exclusive. One cannot go in two opposite directions at the same time -- one the way to disarmament and the other the way to speeding up the armaments race.

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Day by day, events reveal to us new aspects of the plan for the creation of a multilateral NATO force. Yesterday we heard of submarines armed with nuclear missiles, and carrying a mixed crew. Today we hear of warships with nuclear missiles. The West German Bundeswehr is growing more and more insistent in its demand for missiles with nuclear warheads. The circle of States that will be given access to nuclear weapons is being widened. The catalogue of nuclear weapons that will be handed over to other States which are allies of the United States is also growing. But if a large number and a larger variety of nuclear weapons are necessary, then nuclear tests will also be necessary to create such weapons. The whole world knows that the United States is now carrying out such nuclear weapon tests. But, faced with the determined demands of the peoples of the world to put an end to such nuclear tests, the United States is trying to find ways to cover up its negative policy.

We have already drawn attention to the tendentious and often grossly distorted way in which the nuclear test ban negotiations are reported in the United States Press. At the end of February, for example the Associated Press deliberately spread false and distorted information about one of our meetings with a sensational headline to the effect that the Soviet delegation rejects black boxes. It should be borne in mind that all this is not harmless reporting likely to provoke merry laughter, but a malicious attempt to create around our negotiations such an atmosphere and draw such a picture of them as would hinder to the greatest extent the achievement of an agreement. The representatives of the United States are contributing to this to the extent of their powers and capacities at this Conference.

The United States delegation is obviously trying to lend fuel to the campaign which is being developed in the United States against an agreement on a nuclear test ban. Take a look at the kind of headlines, taken from the statements of Mr. Stelle, which are appearing in the United States Press. The day before yesterday the New York Times of 7 March 1963 published under screaming headlines a report from Geneva maliciously distorting the substance of the matter and saying that the Soviet Union "demands capitulation of the Western Powers", that it "delivers an ultimatum", and so on. Anyone can see that such an evaluation of the position of the other side, coming from the official representative here of the United States, serves only to inflame



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passions in the United States over this question, with the obvious purpose of tightening the screw further, driving a deeper wedge, heating up the sentiments opposed to an agreement, and closing the path to the achievement of agreement.

We believe that there are still possibilities of coming to an agreement; but as many representatives here have rightly observed, we must not let these possibilities disappear.

The Soviet Union is interested in an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, but, of course, on a mutually-acceptable basis. The Soviet Government desires to conclude such an agreement because it corresponds with the interests of the Soviet people, the American people, the British people and all the other peoples of the world, and because it corresponds with the interests of the consolidation of peace in the world. If the Western Powers stop seeking for ways to avoid an agreement and accept the compromise proposal of the Soviet Union, which goes a long way to meet them, very little time will be required in order to have on the Conference table an agreed text for a treaty on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests. The key to success is in the hands of the United States.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): I believe it goes without saying that there is much in the statement we have just heard from the representative of the Soviet Union with which my delegation disagrees and at which we are disturbed. I am particularly disturbed by the tired reiteration of the inaccurate statement that the United States, whether officially or unofficially, has proposed two to three on-site inspections. No official representative of the United States has ever proposed two to three on-site inspections, officially or unofficially. We have placed on the record the clear account of the particular occasion which has been made the basis for that claim in official correspondence from the Soviet Union. I think the record is clear to every member of this Committee. The constant reiteration of that inaccurate statement is clearly one of the all too familiar attempts to establish the untrue as true through mere repetition.

The whole Soviet case that the United States has retreated from a position it had adopted, or that it is asking for more than it previously asked for, is false. We had hoped we should hear no more of this after we had laid the facts on the table. We have heard more of it, but it does not alter the situation. The President of the United States, in a letter to Chairman Khrushchev, (ENDC/74) stated the position of the United States on the number of inspections. He used the figures eight to ten.

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The unacceptability of the figure of two or three was made crystal clear to the Soviet representatives who took part in the informal private discussions in New York and Washington in January -- representatives who included Mr. Tsarapkin. We shall probably hear that distortion and inaccuracy again. However, it is clear that it is only because the Soviet Union realizes the rigidity of its present position, realizes that all the world knows the rigidity of its present position, and realizes that all the world knows that that position has been and is unacceptable to the United States, that we hear the stale repetitions of that particular distortion.

At the same time there are certain things in the statement we have just heard with which to some extent my delegation can agree. The Soviet representative said that the two sides were closer together than they had even been before. He ascribed that to concessions by the Soviet Union. We will quite freely admit that it arises from moves on both sides. We have stated our gratification at the Soviet Union's decision to re-accept the principle of on-site inspection. We have expressed our feeling -- our sincere feeling -- that that was a very significant step and that it opened the way for serious and promising negotiations.

The two sides are closer together. We have in principle -- and our Soviet colleague has frequently in the past stressed the importance of agreement in principle -- delineated between us the general type of verification system that both of us are prepared to accept. We may have differences about what degree of reliance we place on one or other part of that system, but we are in agreement that it will be a system which, in accordance with the eight-nation memorandum (ENDC/28), will place its primary reliance on national systems. We may argue about what national systems we are discussing.

We for our part think that our primary reliance will be placed upon our own national system, supplemented -- and supplemented importantly -- by the Soviet system, by automatic stations both inside and outside the Soviet Union, and, since our primary interest is the territory of the Soviet Union, by such other stations as might add data on what goes on inside the Soviet Union. But we are agreed that the system should be one which places primary reliance on national systems. Owing to the welcome Soviet move in again accepting on-site inspection, we are agreed also that the system should include obligatory on-site inspection. We are agreed also that there should be an international commission, the functions of which we have not yet spelled out in detail. So our Soviet colleague is quite correct in saying that we are closer to agreement than we have ever been before.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

Despite many of the things the Soviet representative had to say, I took a certain degree of satisfaction in noting to what he devoted a considerable part of his statement. Sir Paul Mason described (Supra, p.15) the situation which existed earlier in the three-Power test-ban negotiations, when there was in fact a battle over the agenda, with the Soviet Union wanting to have signed or discussed a short document bearing the general obligation to stop tests, and with the Western Powers wanting to discuss the means by which the observance of the obligation could be verified. Sir Paul Mason said that we never did really reach an agenda agreement but eventually, as it were, slipped into talking about what each of us wanted to talk about, so that both of us were finally talking about the same things. The reason I say that, despite much of what was said by our Soviet colleague today, I was somewhat gratified by what he talked about in part is that it seems to me that perhaps actually, at our last meeting and today, our Soviet and Eastern colleagues have not slipped into but plunged into a discussion of technical details.

We are glad to discuss technical details, and we will in due course make appropriate replies to what has been said today by our Soviet colleague and to what was said at our meeting on 6 March (ENDC/PV.105) by our Romanian, Polish and Bulgarian colleagues. However, now that our Soviet colleague has entered into a discussion of highly technical details -- and that in great detail -- and has abandoned his insistence that we talk about nothing except the number of on-site inspections and, less importantly, the number of automatic stations, I think it should be a little easier for him to move upward towards a somewhat greater range of generality and talk more about the general framework of the technical or political-technical basis of a treaty, something that we must have agreement on before we can sign a treaty.

I speak, of course, of the general arrangements on which we need to have understanding before the numbers about which our Soviet colleague wants to talk can have any real meaning. I went into them in considerable detail in my statement at our last meeting, and I do not intend to repeat them now. But before a number -- any number -- of on-site inspections has relevance, we must know whether we are in general agreement with our Soviet colleagues on what triggers an inspection, who is to carry out such inspections, how large an area may be searched, the shape of the area in general terms, what an inspection team can do when it gets to the area in terms of its duty of looking for evidence of a possible violation.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

Surely if our Eastern friends can spend the time to go into detail as they have done at our last two meetings --- and I do not decry this and we are quite willing to discuss it --- surely they can take the time to speak in general terms of their ideas regarding what arrangements there should be, or at least respond to the questions we raised as long ago as the middle of January about whether or not they find major elements of difficulty with the ideas we have put forward about what reasonable arrangements might be. I hope we shall progress to that stage, and that it will be soon.

I cannot, of course, accept the various accusations levelled at the United States today by the Soviet representative. The attempt to make it appear as if the United States does not want, is trying to block, or is trying to delay a nuclear test ban treaty is without any foundation. We have shown in the positions we have taken at this Conference in the past and recently that we are carrying out our instructions to do our best to achieve a sound treaty arrangement. Allegations that the United States does not want a treaty and is trying to block or delay it are false.

I must take exception also to the objections Mr. Tsarapkin raised to the use of the words "ultimatum" and "capitulation" in the United States press. The present Soviet position is that of an ultimatum. The present Soviet position does demand a capitulation by the United States to a figure which the Soviet Union has known and knows is unacceptable as the price of any treaty; and the Soviet Union now refuses -- although we hope this may change in the future --- to discuss anything except a number which it knows is unacceptable to the United States. That represents a position which is an ultimatum, an ultimatum to the effect that the Soviet Union will agree to a treaty only if there is capitulation by the United States. The United States wants a treaty; the United States will not capitulate.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and sixth plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Tarabanov, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and representative of Bulgaria.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Italy, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Monday, 11 March 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.